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Public health has always been open to research in a wide range of disciplines. These 
disciplines include fields within the physical and natural sciences, but also social scientific 
and humanities subjects. One humanities subject in particular has greater relevance than 
most to public health. That subject is philosophy. Beyond the obvious contribution of 
philosophy to public health in areas like ethics, philosophy can contribute insights on issues 
such as the nature of knowledge and reasoning. In fact, such is the reach of philosophy into 
public health that Christakos et al.1 (p 66) have remarked that '[i]n the end, public health 
scientists may find themselves acting as a kind of applied philosopher. The interdisciplinary, 
multi-cultural, and multi-objective nature of the world could leave them no choice.' (italics 
in original) In this article, I want to argue that a philosophical discipline known as informal 
logic has an important contribution to make to public health. 
Informal logic is a relatively recent development in the long history of logic. It is concerned 
with the study of argument forms that are not amenable to analysis within formal 
(deductive) logic. The impetus for a separate discipline of logic arose when it became 
apparent that although people are capable of engaging in deductive reasoning, they are 
much more likely to use plausible or presumptive reasoning in their everyday affairs.2 The 
hallmark of this type of reasoning is that it is sensitive to features of context. As such, it is 
defeasible in a way that deductive reasoning is not (features of context, after all, are not 
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immutable but are subject to change). This new emphasis on examining arguments in the 
contexts in which they occur had important implications for one group of arguments in 
particular, known as the informal fallacies. These arguments, which include such names as 
the argument from ignorance and question-begging argument, had traditionally been 
characterized as weak or fallacious forms of reasoning. However, when examined in the 
contexts in which they are advanced, it became increasingly apparent to logicians that these 
arguments have certain merits.3"4 I have argued that these merits include a capacity to 
bridge gaps in our knowledge of the type frequently encountered at the outset of a scientific 
inquiry.5"7 This lack of knowledge or uncertainty threatens to stall scientific inquiry which, in 
the case of public health, could delay the implementation of important protective health 
measures. In serving to bridge these gaps in knowledge, the informal fallacies can be seen to 
confer epistemic gains on scientific inquiry. 
In Cummings,8 I used concepts and techniques from informal logic to conduct an analysis of 
the reasoning of scientists who were called upon to consider the public health risks posed 
by the emergence of BSE in British cattle. That study revealed that argument forms such as 
the argument from ignorance and question-begging argument were commonly found in the 
reasoning of scientists who sat on expert scientific committees such as the Southwood 
Working Party. Although the details of that analysis are beyond the scope of this article, a 
brief examination of one of these argument forms - the argument from ignorance -
demonstrates the type of factors that played a role in that analysis. In any argument from 
ignorance, one argues from a lack of knowledge (evidence or proof) that X is true to the 
conclusion that X is false (alternatively, from a lack of knowledge that X is false to the 
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conclusion that X is true). In schematic form, this argument appears as follows, where X may 
be taken to stand for a proposition, statement or claim: 
There is no evidence that X is true (premise) 
Therefore, X is false (conclusion) 
'No evidence' arguments of the above type were used so extensively by scientists during the 
BSE epidemic that Lord Phillips9 called them the 'mantra' of the BSE affair. One such 
argument is presented below: 
There is no evidence that scrapie is transmissible to humans (premise) 
Therefore, scrapie is not transmissible to humans (conclusion) 
The argument from ignorance is a rationally warranted form of argument when two 
conditions are satisfied: (1) the knowledge base in a particular domain is complete or closed 
and (2) the knowledge base has been exhaustively searched. In the case of the above 
argument, both these conditions were fulfilled. Extensive epidemiological investigations of 
scrapie and CJD had been conducted over many years and in different countries (i.e. the 
epidemiological knowledge base was complete). Also, a review10 of these investigations 
failed to find any evidence of a link between scrapie, a TSE of sheep, and human disease (i.e. 
the epidemiological knowledge base had been exhaustively searched). Under these 
conditions, it was rational for scientists to conclude that scrapie is not transmissible to 
humans. The use of an argument from ignorance by scientists had effectively transformed a 
negative epistemic situation (a lack of knowledge of the transmissibility of scrapie to 
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humans) into a positive epistemic situation (a claim to the effect that scrapie is not 
transmissible to humans). This transformation had certain benefits for scientists. Chief 
among them was that the conclusion of this ignorance argument - scrapie is not 
transmissible to humans - could be employed as a premise in further reasoning that was 
used in making risk assessments and in instituting health protective measures. This is exactly 
what happened during the BSE epidemic, with scientists using the conclusion of this 
ignorance argument to warrant decisions such as the measures to take in order to contain 
BSE (e.g. the tissues to include in the Specified Bovine Offal ban). 
The reasoning strategies discussed above are not confined to the specific public health 
problem posed by BSE. They have also been analysed in relation to HIV/AIDS.11 In fact, their 
presence is so widespread in public health reasoning that I believe it is important for public 
health researchers and practitioners to be cognizant of this group of arguments. Certainly, 
these arguments represent an important rational resource which could be usefully exploited 
in the public health field. 
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